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ABSTRACT
This study is focused on the linkages between the 
legislative families as descriptors of national legislative 
systems and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs) issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). We consider 
such analysis as a case study for the more general issue 
of explaining the preferences of national regulators 
in the adoption of foreign norms, rules, standards 
and practices. By using a dataset of 162 jurisdictions 
and dummy variables designed to capture the 
current stage of IFRSs adoption and, respectively, the 
taxonomy of their legislative systems, we find that a 
full IFRSs adoption is more likely to occur in countries 
which have principles-based on legislative mono-
systems. In addition, we observe that a strong rule of 
law, with an effective mechanism of property rights 
reinforcement, as well as the pre-adoption existence 
of a pro-growth set of public policies can contribute 
to the encouragement of IFRSs adoption.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Dima B., Dima (Cristea) S., Moldovan N.C., Pirtea M. 
G., 2013. National legislative systems and foreign standards and  regulations: the case of international 
financial reporting standards’ adoption, Ekonomska istraživanja – Economic Research 26(3): 15-30
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of the existence of transnational regulatory entities and of deepening globalization 
processes, the national regulators face several problems in the adoption of exogenous norms, 
rules, standards and practices. The preferences of such bodies for accepting / rejecting or 
adjusting them vary according to a complex set of institutional behaviour determinants. Among 
them, the constitutive and functional characteristics of the domestic legislative structures and 
institutions have an important role. This study is focusing on the possible linkages between the 
adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and the national legislative 
taxonomy. There are several advantages in analysing the IFRSs adoption as a case study for foreign 
standards assimilation mechanisms and influence factors in different autochthonous economic, 
politic, social and cultural systems. A list of such gnoseological advantages that can be achieved 
by studying the particular case of IFRSs adoption in order to provide some insights about the 
acceptance mechanisms for international regulations, standards and practices, far to be exhaustive, 
can include: the specific approach of IFRSs as principles-based standards; the fact that IFRSs are 
issued and promoted by transnational entities but reflect some national practices from developed 
economies; the heterogeneity of individual adoption situations; the eventual conflicts between 
these international standards and national regulations and practices; the existence of an ongoing 
process of international accounting harmonization driven by globalization forces etc.
Currently, there is a growing literature studying the possible interrelations between IFRSs 
adoption and the distinctive features of national legislative institutions and mechanisms: Hope et 
al. (2006) find that those countries which have weaker investor protection mechanisms are more 
likely to adopt IFRSs; Krivogorsky et al. (2010) provide compelling evidence that jurisdictions and 
national levels of bureaucratic formalities in business are factors that modify company likelihood 
to adopt IFRSs early; Armstrong et al. (2008) find that the reaction market reactions to IFRSs 
adoption is less positive for firms resident in code law countries; Ball (2000) provides some empirical 
evidence that code law countries links accounting income directly to current payouts; Ball (2006) 
identifies some problems associated with transferring accounting standards from common law 
to code law, especially with regard to countries that have less respect for protecting shareholders 
value and minority rights; Burgstahler et al. (2006) document that earning management is more 
pronounced in countries with weaker legal systems and enforcement; Leuz et al. (2003) concludes 
that weak outsider protection and private control benefits create incentives to manage earnings. 
This paper seeks to provide two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it adopts a 
more detailed perspective in defining the legislative families based on Faculty of Law, University 
of Ottawa with the help of the Supreme Court of Canada Library data on “world’s legal systems”. 
Secondly, it checks the robustness of our findings by considering other possible explanatory 
variables as well for the countries’ relative preferences in IFRSs adoption for listed companies.
Our arguments can be resumed as follows: 1) the relative preference for professional decisions 
of legal authorities based on precedent customs and practices versus detailed regulations can be 
seen as separation criteria between different types of legislative families adopted by individual 
countries and 2) a major feature of IFRSs consists in the fact that these are a set of principles-based 
standards, promoting professional judgment. Thus, the IFRSs will be easier adopted in countries 
in which the general legislative framework is more oriented toward the practices-based decisions, 
being guided only by a simplified set of principles, and less toward detailed written norms, rules 
and regulations. In order to avoid the costs of institutional dissonances, the decisional bodies will 
tend to adopt that set of standards which is more compatible with the general philosophy of 
the national regulatory framework. More detailed written rules are more efforts are required to 
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incorporate exogenous standards based on a different approach. Due to the costs of institutional 
adjustments, supplementary obstacles for IFRSs adoption can appear if the legislative systems 
are characterized by a higher degree of complexity with various regulations issued by different 
channels and subjects of frequent changes.
II. LEGISLATIVE FAMILIES 
The IFRSs adoption is a complex process involving public authorities, professional bodies or joint 
structures. The preferences of these entities to adopt the standards depend on a complex set of 
factors, including inter alia the general preferences for formal codification of the legislative systems. 
Thus, the nature of the regulatory societal framework, being synthesized by the characteristics 
of the “legislative families” is expected to influence the context, amplitude and effects of IFRSs 
adoption.
The concept of „legislative families” was introduced within the comparative law at the 
beginning of the 19th century. Subsequently, different criteria have been suggested in order to 
perform a typology of the judicial systems, their classification being essentially an academic 
instrument, but also useful to any person wanting to capitalize it as a comparative argument. The 
estimation criteria regarding the affiliation of a jurisdiction to a legislative family or another, have 
varied along history, starting from those of geographical and religious type (Esmein, 1905) to those 
which had in view race (Sauser-Hall, 1913), historical origins (Sarfatti, 1933), the contents of the 
law (Arminjon et al. 1951), and the judicial style (Zweigert and Krotz, 1998). These have proven to 
be useful instruments leading to the identification of a number of legislative families in which the 
judicial systems could be integrated. 
Among the criticism critically upon the old classifications, Mattei (1997), starting from the 
judicial theory and sociology of Max Weber, suggests a classification distinguishing between rule 
of professional law, rule of political law and rule of traditional law. Similarly, Vanderlinden (1995) 
looks emphasize five law systems: common, doctrinarian, jurisprudence, legislative law and the 
system of revelation. 
Although the identified judicial systems are somehow similar to one another, being 
based on similar cultural and operational traditions within the context of certain similar social, 
economic and political conditions, the approached legislative families did not answer absolutely 
to the challenges generated by the judicial culture and mentality, within the context of a lack of 
cooperation with areas such as judicial sociology, history of law or anthropology (Gessner et al. 
1996). Thus, a more recent evolution is the so-called “third judicial family” and the idea of mixed 
judicial systems. The term “mixed” must be construed restrictively, so that this category defines 
the case in which two or more systems apply cumulatively or interactively. For instance, Palmer 
(2001) underlined the idea that mixed jurisdictions represent in fact the third major judicial family 
alongside of common law and Roman-German law. Currently, there are some attempts of creating 
an approach referring to the “family trees”- Örücü (2004) - the main object being the attempt 
of demolishing the conventional model of the judicial systems and creating their reconstruction 
in which the judicial systems should be classified according to their filiations and constitutive 
elements. However, there are other attempts of renewing the old tradition of the judicial families 
as well (Reyntjens, 1991 and Heiss, 2001).
Our view is that the analysis of the various concepts met in literature allows us to conclude 
that each judicial system tends to acquire special characteristics in accordance with the respective 
jurisdictions and populations, despite the affiliation to the same judicial family. 
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Hence, civil law is currently the judicial system met in most of the world countries, its primary 
source being legislation, the normative judicial acts (especially codifications). These codes are 
mainly characterized by a high level of generalization which allows judges to construe and analyze 
the whole practical circumstances, either by applying the law or by completing the gaps through 
extrapolation.
What differentiates the essential judicial system of common law from other judicial systems 
is the explicit recognition of the decision ordered by legal courts as a primary source of law; 
being a system based on induction in which the judicial concepts are the result of a consequent 
jurisprudence which defines the application areas. Within the context of the express recognition 
of the judicial precedent as a legal source, the decisions ordered by the higher courts become 
compulsory for the inferior courts. However, in certain jurisdictions, the state reserves the right 
of proceeding to the annulment of the judicial decisions and the performance of a codification, 
taking into consideration that there are multiple conflicting or ambiguous judicial decisions. 
Regarded as a complex of traditions and customs which, in time, have become law, 
common law can develop based on religion, ethnicity or cultural identity. It has sometimes an 
important significance in the matter of the personal state in a significant number of countries with 
mixed judicial systems which tend to apply to “common laws” under the shape of the codes. This 
is specific to a number of African countries but it’s also the case of China or India, for instance, 
but in very different conditions. The Islamic judicial system is an autonomous system of religious 
nature, explicitly based on religious principles, predominantly on Koran. One of the distinctive 
characteristics of the Islamic law is the fact that the rights of the community are above those 
of the man, the individual rights and freedoms being restricted by moral, religious and divine 
imperatives. The system is used in countries with Islamic tradition where moral norms recently 
tend to be interpreted in a broader sense, in order to adapt them to the contemporary realities. 
No doubt, the existence of the mixed judicial families allows the prominence of more law 
systems which can find applicability simultaneously regarding the same political entity. These 
include two or more legislative systems interacting in a multicultural and multi-religious society, 
being sometimes applied complementarily. The judicial systems from various countries in North 
Africa or Middle East are strongly influenced by the civil law tradition but, in certain fields - 
especially in those affecting the individual and family rights and the property rights - the structure 
of this system tends to follow the Islamic tradition. Taking into account these distinctive features 
of legislative families, our research hypothesis is:
H: The preference of regulators from an individual country to adopt IFRSs will increase as the 
autochthonous legislative system is closer to Common Law and Civil Law mono-systems.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to test our hypothesis, we have constructed two dummy variables: IFRSs dummy and, 
respectively, legislative families dummy for 162 jurisdictions according to current available 
information (see Table 1). The first dummy is designed to reflect several stages of IFRSs adoption. 
In our dataset, for 37% of the included countries, IFRSs are not required nor permitted for quoted 
companies. For 4.9%, IFRSs are permitted while for 10.5% of cases, IFRSs are required for some 
companies. Only in 47.6% of cases, the international standards are required for all companies.
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TABLE 1. DEPENDENT AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Variable Description Source
IFRSs dummy Dummy taking the next values:
•	 “0” - IFRSs are not permitted/ not 
mentioned by the relevant legislation and 
no de facto compliance can be observed; 
•	 “1” - IFRSs are permitted for listed 
companies (individual and consolidated 
financial statements) but the international 
standards are not compulsory; 
•	 “2” - IFRSs required for some listed 
companies (e.g. large companies, financial 
institutions and so on); 
•	 “3” - IFRSs required for all listed companies 
both for individual and consolidated 
financial statements.
Since the identification of different 
intermediary situations is sometimes 
difficult, data are compiled from 
various sources, mainly Deloitte 
(2010), PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2010), Ernst&Young (2010), Financial 
Standards Foundation (2010), World 
Bank (2010b), International Monetary 





Captures the typology of the legislative families Coded by authors based on University 
of Ottawa (2010)
Rule of law Captures perceptions to the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence.
World Bank (2010a)
Real GDP per 
capita
Real GDP per capita (log) (US dollars at constant 
prices and exchange rates-2000)
UNCTAD (2010)
Source:  Author calculation
On the website of the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa with the help of the Supreme 
Court of Canada Library on “world’s legal systems”, the categories of legal systems are divided into: 
civil law, common law, customary law, Muslim law and mixed law (University of Ottawa, 2010). 
We find, in these categories, countries in which two or more legal systems apply concurrently or 
interactively, as well as those in which systems are rather juxtaposed because they apply to more 
or less clearly distinct fields. According to this source, “mixed systems” appear in the following 
categories: Thus, our dummy variable for legislative families can take values from 1 to 27 (see Table 
2). The number of jurisdictions that fall into the “mixed systems with civil law” category is 65 
(19.12% of the world’s legal systems), “mixed systems with common law” are 53 (15.59 %), “mixed 
systems with customary law” are 54 (15.88%) and “mixed systems with Muslim law” are 33 (9.70 
%).
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TABLE 2. LEGISLATIVE FAMILIES
Codification Description
                         Simple legal families
1 Civil Law (mono-system)
2 Common Law (mono-system)
3 Muslim Law (mono-system)
4 Customary Law (mono-system)
                      Mixed legal families
(Hybrids with civil law, common law, Muslim law or customary law in different combinations)
5 Hybrids with Civil Law and Muslim Law (3.14% of world population)
6 Hybrids with Civil Law and Customary Law (28.54% of world population)
7 Hybrids with Civil Law and Common Law (3.47% of world population)
8 Hybrids with Civil Law, Common Law and Customary Law (0.8% of world population)
9 Hybrids with Customary Law and Common Law
10 Hybrids with Customary Law and Civil Law
11 Hybrids with Common Law and Customary (2.94% of world population)
12 Hybrids with Common Law and Civil Law
13 Hybrids with Common Law and Muslim Law (5.25% of world population)
14 Hybrids with Muslim Law and Common Law
15 Hybrids with Muslim Law and Civil Law
16 Hybrids with Muslim Law, Civil Law  and Customary Law
17 Hybrids with Muslim Law, Common Law and Customary Law
18 Hybrids with Muslim Law, Civil Law, Common Law and Customary Law
19 Hybrids with Civil Law, Muslim Law and Customary Law (3.62% of world population)
20 Hybrids with Civil Law, Customary Law and Muslim Law
21 Hybrids with Common Law, Muslim Law and Customary Law (19.17% of world population)
22 Hybrids with Civil Law, Common Law, Jewish Law and Muslim Law (0.09% of world population)
23 Hybrids with Customary Law and Muslim Law
24 Hybrids with Common Law , Civil Law and Customary Law
25 Hybrids with Muslim Law, Customary Law and Civil Law
26 Hybrids with Civil Law, Common Law and Customary Law
27 Hybrids with Civil Law, Customary Law and Common Law 
Source: Author calculation
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The main statistic properties of the data are listed in Table 3. 
TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF LEGISLATIVE FAMILIES AND IFRSS ADOPTION




 Minimum 1 0.00
 Std. Dev. 5.86 1.39
 Skewness 1.32 -0.26
Kurtosis 3.87 1.22
Jarque-Bera 52.31 23.43
Cross-section observations 162 162
Source: Author calculation
The values of dispersion, the non-normal distribution and the presence of the fat tails 
effects suggest that there is an important degree of data heterogeneity. Thus, it is necessary to 
employ an estimation method robust to such heterogeneity. We appeal to the Generalized Linear 
Models (GLM) estimation framework. This methodology allows flexible specifications of the 
model and “for non-normal data without clustering, generalized linear models are an appropriate 
alternative to linear models” (Tuerlinckx et al., 2006).  
IV. RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the standalone GLM estimation. It appears that the type of legislative 
families exercises a significant influence of 1% to IFRSs adoption. The negative sign suggests that 
this influence is more in favour of boosting up the adoption as the legislative structures are closer 
to simple civil and common law systems.
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Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Figures in bracket represent the t- statistic; For the 
Generalized Linear Model estimations: a) Family: Poisson; b) Link function: Log; c) Optimization algorithm: BHHH (Model 2) and, 
respectively, Quadratic Hill Climbing (Model 3); For Quantile Regression estimation: a) Coefficient covariance: Bootstrap (10000 
replications); b) Sparsity estimation: Siddiqui (mean fitted) - bandwidth method: Hall-Sheather (size parameter: 0.05); c) Random 
generator: Knuth; d) Bootstrap method: Markov Chain Marginal (as modified by Kocherginsky, He and Mu, 2005); for Binary equation: 
binary choice- extreme value model;  Included observations: 162.
A first way to check the robustness of these results can consist in taking into account some 
control variables. We first consider the “rule of law” variable as this is captured in the methodology 
proposed by Kaufman et al. (2010) and reported by Worldwide Governance Indicators World Bank’ 
project (WGI) (2010a). There are several transmission channels through which the rule of law can 
support the IFRSs adoption. For instance, we may argue that the investor’s demand for fair value 
information and a company’s commitment to transparency increase the likelihood of providing 
such information by taking into account the requirements of IFRSs. There is some recent empirical 
evidence to support this thesis (see Muller et al., 2008). One possible argument  is that increased 
disclosure as a consequence of IFRSs adoption can enforce the corporate reputation (Espinosa et 
al., 2004), improves the market liquidity (Verrecchia, 2001), and lowers company’s cost of capital 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001, Core, 2001) and so it can provide an informational rent for owners.
The pre-existence of a sound legal system, with effective mechanisms of reinforcement for 
property rights and investors protection, can also support higher net inflows of foreign investments 
(Hewko, 2002). Furthermore, the presence of foreign investors will exercise a supplementary 
pressure on local decisional bodies to adopt IFRSs, since such an adoption benefits them as well 
as foreign debtors due at least to: a) reducing the information processing cost of foreign investors 
and b) lowering the effect of other barriers on cross-border investments such as the geographic 
distance (Beneish et al. 2009). Such channel applies both for direct and equity foreign investments 
(Brüggemann et al., 2009; DeFond et al., 2009).   
Besides the rule of law, we also consider the economic growth as a possible key determinant 
of IFRSs adoption. Archambault and Archambault (2009) document that less economically 
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developed countries are more likely to allow IFRSs. Ramanna and Sletten (2010) argue that as 
more jurisdictions with economic ties to a given country adopt IFRSs, benefits perceived from 
lowering transactions costs to foreign financial-statement users come to outweigh institutional 
differences.
Our main argument is that, in a pro-growth oriented policy framework, the adoption of IFRSs 
can appear as a “natural” solution considering its various potential benefits. Among others, the 
adoption: a) can improve the activity of capital markets especially in relation to small companies 
in insider economies (Schleicher et al., 2010; Daske et al., 2008); b) can contribute to a decrease 
in companies’ cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations (Daske et al., 2008); c) can 
strength the authorities’ responsiveness to risks, prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk 
management (Financial Stability Forum, 2008). All these effects can largely contribute to economic 
growth and, so, decisional bodies can support the IFRSs adoption as a growth engine. Thus, we 
are expecting that both rule of law and economic growth to have a positive impact on adoption 
processes. 
The outputs of a covariance analysis between IFRSs and legislative families’ dummies and, 
respectively, World Bank proxy for rule of law and real GDP per capita are displayed in Table 5 
(Spearman rank-order covariance) and Table 6 (Kendall’s tau). According with these outputs, it can 
be concluded that as long as the considered transmission channels between the control variables, 
IFRSs adoption and legislative structures can be sustained theoretically, they are also empirically 
valid.
TABLE 5. COVARIANCE ANALYSIS OF IFRSS ADOPTION DUMMY AND EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES - SPEARMAN RANK-ORDER COVARIANCES
 
 
Covariance Correlation t-Statistic Probability
L e g i s l a t i v e 
f a m i l i e s 
dummy
IFRSs adoption dummy -839.82 -0.43 -6.08 0.00
Rule of law IFRSs adoption dummy 979.93 0.49 7.03 0.00
Rule of law Legislative families dummy -417.69 -0.20 -2.55 0.07
Real GDP per 
capita
IFRSs adoption dummy 849.58 0.42 5.87 0.00
Real GDP per 
capita
Legislative families dummy -607.15 -0.29 -3.79 0.00
Real GDP per 
capita
Rule of law 1820.79 0.83 18.64 0.00
Notes: Included observations: 162; Dunn-Sidak multiple comparison adjusted probabilities; the test statistics and associated ρ-values 
reported are meant to test the hypothesis that a single correlation coefficient is equal to zero; degree of freedom adjusted.
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TABLE 6. COVARIANCE ANALYSIS OF IFRSS ADOPTION DUMMY AND EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES - KENDALL’S TAU MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION
 
 
tau-b tau-a Score (S) Concordance Discordance Probability
Legis lative 
f a m i l i e s 
dummy
I F R S s 
adoption 
dummy
-0.37 -0.26 -3357.00 1766.00 5123.00 0.00
Rule of law
I F R S s 
adoption 
dummy





-0.14 -0.13 -1636.00 4335.00 5971.00 0.08
Real GDP 
per capita
I F R S s 
adoption 
dummy






-0.21 -0.18 -2378.00 3964.00 6342.00 0.00
Real GDP 
per capita
Rule of law 0.64 0.64 8355.00 10698.00 2343.00 0.00
Notes: Included observations: 162; Dunn-Sidak multiple comparison adjusted probabilities; the test statistics and associated 
ρ-values reported are for testing the hypothesis that a single correlation coefficient is equal to zero; degree of freedom adjusted.
Thus, column 2 of Table 4 reports our empirical evidences for the existence of a significant 
positive effect at 1% of better legislative framework and sustainable growth to adoption. 
Moreover, the robustness can be checked, for instance, by modifying the estimation procedure. 
The modifications might refer to: 1) changes in optimization procedure for GLM framework and 
2) changes in methodology.
Thus, column 3 of Table 4 presents the results obtained when the optimization procedure 
shifts from BHHH algorithm to the so-called Quadratic Hill Climbing algorithm. With the exception 
of minor modifications in t-statistics, there are no significant changes in the relevance of considered 
variables with such shift. Column 4 displays the output of quantile regression estimation. 
Originally proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), quantile regression provides estimates of the 
linear relationship between regressors and a specified quantile of the dependent variable. One 
important special case of quantile regression is the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator, which 
corresponds to fitting the conditional median of the response variable. Such method allows a more 
complete description of the conditional distribution than conditional mean analysis alone and, 
since it does not require strong distributional assumptions, it offers a distributional robust method 
of modelling the relationship between different percentiles of dependent and the explanatory 
variables. We employ a bootstrap estimation (10000 replications) based on the Markov Chain 
Marginal Bootstrap (MCMB) in the version developed by Kocherginsky et al. (2005). This version 
alleviates the autocorrelation problems that can appear in the standard version of MCMB by prior 
transforming the parameter space and after the performance of the MCMB algorithm, transferring 
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the results back to the original space. This methodology substantially improves the significance of 
the estimated parameters.
In addition, we have tested the capacity of our conceptual framework to predict the 
extreme cases (full adoption of current IFRSs). Such choice is justified by the fact that in our 
dataset only 48% of the observed cases represent the last stage of IFRSs adoption, whereas the 
others count for intermediary stages. Thus, it can be argued that, if our model is sound, it should 
be able to predict the situations of full IFRSs adoption and to discriminate between such situation 
and other stages of adoption. In order to perform such test, the IFRSs dummy is transformed in a 
binary variable according to the next rule:
(1)
The binary estimation is reported in column 5 of Table 4. All the variables are remaining 
significant at 1% after the transformation of the dependent variable. The binary equation also 
allows an estimation of the model predictor capacity through the so-called classification table. 
The fraction of observations that are correctly predicted is termed sensitivity, while the fraction of 
observations that are correctly predicted is labelled as specificity. The content of such classification 
is displayed in Table 7 with prediction results based upon expected value calculations. 
TABLE 7. EXPECTATION-PREDICTION EVALUATION FOR BINARY SPECIFICATION











E(Binary_IFRSs = 0) 56.15 29.58 85.73 44.60 40.40 85.00
E(Binary_IFRSs = 1) 28.85 47.42 76.27 40.40 36.60 77.00
Total 85.00 77.00 162.00 85.00 77.00 162.00
Correct 56.15 47.42 103.57 44.60 36.60 81.20
% Correct 66.06 61.59 63.93 52.47 47.53 50.12
% Incorrect 33.94 38.41 36.07 47.53 52.47 49.88
Total Gain* 13.59 14.06 13.81
Percent Gain** 28.59 26.80 27.69
Hosmer-Lemeshov Statistic 3.05 Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.93
Andrews Statistic 8.04 Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.63
Notes: *Change in “% Correct” from default (constant probability) specification; **Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected 
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Such expected values are computed in the left-hand table. In the lower right-hand table, we 
can compute the expected number of Binary_IFRSs= 0 and Binary_IFRSs= 1 observations for a 
model estimated with only a constant. For this restricted model, E (Binary_IFRSs= 0) is computed 
as n(1-p), where p is the sample proportion of Binary_IFRSs= 1  observations. A classification is 
labelled as “correct” when the predicted probability is less than or equal to the cut-off (70% in our 
estimation) and the observed Binary_IFRSs= 0, or when the predicted probability is higher than 
the cut-off and the observed Binary_IFRSs= 1. Overall, the estimated model predicts 63.93% of the 
observations (66% of the observations with dependent = 0 and 61.6% of the observations with 
dependent = 1) correctly. It appears that the levels of sensitivity and, respectively, specificity for our 
model are almost the same, implying that it can discriminate both „extreme” and „regular” cases. 
The gain in the number of correct predictions obtained by moving from the right table to the left 
table provides a measure of the predictive ability of our model. Roughly, there is an improvement 
of 27.69% over the constant probability model with our estimation. The Goodness-of-Fit tests, 
Hosmer-Lemeshow and Andrews, compare the expected fitted values to the actual values by group. 
If these differences are “small enough”, the model is fitting the data adequately. The values of these 
tests, also reported in Table 7, suggest that this is the case with the binary specification.
Overall, we view these results as providing some empirical support for our research 
hypothesis by highlighting the preference of Common Law and Civil Law countries to adopt in 
full the IFRSs.
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We hypothesize that countries which are characterized by principles and practices-based 
legislative systems are more likely to adopt IFRSs. In order to test such hypothesis, we have 
constructed, for a dataset of 162 jurisdictions, dummy variables designed to capture the current 
stage of IFRSs adoption and, respectively, the taxonomy of their legislative systems. We have tested 
the linkages between such variables inside a GLM framework and obtained robust evidences that 
the full adoption of IFRSs is more likely to occur for countries with mono-systems of Common 
Law and Civil Law types. Thus, we conclude that a flexible, homogenous and practices oriented 
general legislative system can be a prerequisite for a smooth and complete IFRSs adoption. We also 
find that a strong rule of law, with an effective mechanism of property rights reinforcement, can 
contribute to a faster IFRSs adoption. Such result does not necessarily contradict other findings 
in literature, since the IFRSs adoption can be viewed as an expression of the overview concern of 
decisional bodies to support the quality of contract enforcement, the property rights and the 
social order and not only as a tool for the compensation of the national legislative framework’ 
deficiencies. Similarly, it appears that the pre-adoption existence of a pro-growth set of public 
policies can facilitate the IFRSs adoption. Of course, the significance of our analysis depends on 
the relevance of the considered transmission channels which are far from being completely and 
consistently described on a conceptual level and perfectly robust empirically tested. However, the 
provided evidences can contribute to enhance a broader explanatory framework of the conditions 
in which there is a clear preference of regulatory bodies to adopt international standards.
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NACIONALNI ZAKONODAVNI SUSTAV I MEĐUNARODNI 
STANDARDI I PROPISI: SLUČAJ USVAJANJA MEĐUNARODNIH 
STANDARDA FINANCIJSKOG IZVJEŠTAVANJA1 
SAŽETAK
Ova studija je fokusirana na veze između zakonodavnih okvira kao deskriptora nacionalnih 
zakonodavnih sustava i Međunarodnih standarda financijskog izvješćivanja (MSFI), koje objavljuje 
Odbor za međunarodne računovodstvene standarde (IASB). Takve analize se razmatraju kao 
studije slučaja za šira pitanja u objašnjenju preferencija nacionalnih vlasti u usvajanju stranih 
normi, propisa, standarda i praksi. Korištenjem skupa podataka od 162 pravne i dummy 
varijable, osmišljene za dostizanje trenutne faze usvajanja MSFI-a, odnosno, taksonomije njihovih 
zakonodavnih sustava, smatra se da će se puna primjena MSFI-a vjerojatnije dogoditi u zemljama 
koje svoja načela temeljena zakonskim monosustavima. Osim toga, primjetno je da snažna 
vladavina prava,uz učinkovit mehanizam jačanja imovinskih prava, kao i prethodno donošenje 
skupa javnih politika rasta, može pridonijeti poticanju usvajanja MSFI-a.
Ključne riječi: usvajanje MSFI-a, zakonodavni okviri, vladavina prava, rast
1 Zahvala: Autori zahvaljuju sudionicima Međunarodne konferencije „RAČUNOVODSTVENARENESANSA“: 
Predavanja o krizi i Pogled u budućnost. Učenje iz povijesti i institucija (Venecija, 3. - 5. studenog 2011.) 
i sudionicima na 34. godišnjem kongresu Europske računovodstvene udruge (Rim,20.-22. travnja 2011.) za 
njihove komentare i korisne prijedloge, osobito prof.dr. Christopheru Nobesu (Royal Holloway, Sveučilište u 
Londonu) i prof.dr. Alexu Halleru (Sveučilište u Regensburgu). Štoviše, ovaj rad je podržan od strane projekta 
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